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DISCOVERY RULE: ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
An acute problem in medical malpractice litigation is the appli-
cation of the appropriate statute of limitation, particularly in cases
involving foreign objects left in a patient's body as a result of an
internal operation. The foreign objects' often do not become evident
until many years after the initial operation and in many instances
only after the prescribed statute of limition has run. When a lawsuit
is filed under these circumstances, the question often presented is
whether the cause of action accrued at the time of the negligent opera-
tion or at the time of the discovery of the negligent act. The most
recent theory emerging from the resolution of this question is the dis-
covery rule. Under the discovery rule the cause of action for medical
malpractice accrues when the patient learns or, in the exercise of
reasonable care and diligence, should have learned of the presence
of the foreign object in his body.
In Gaddis v. Smith,2 Texas became the most recent state to adopt
the discovery rule, thereby aligning itself with a growing number of
other state, as well as federal, courts.3 In 1959, Dr. W. C. Smith, a
Texas physician, performed a caesarean section upon Mrs. Dorothy
Gaddis leaving a surgical sponge inside her body. Mrs. Gaddis subse-
quently suffered internal pain but did not discover the cause of the
pain until an exploratory operation was performed on her in 1963.
Prior to the operation in 1963, she did not know, and had no way of
knowing, that the surgical sponge had been left inside her body. Mrs.
Gaddis filed suit in 1964 against the physician for expenses and pain
and suffering caused as a result of the physician's negligence. Dr. Smith
raised the two-year personal injury statute of limitation as a defense.4
'Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.9d 908 (1936) (surgical tubing); Billings
v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964) (surgical sponge); Spath v.
Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962) (surgical needle); Fernandi v. Strully,
35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961) (wing-nut from a surgical retractor).
'417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967).
9Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d
234 (sth Cir. 1962); United States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691 (5th Gir. 1958); Billings v.
Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241
Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966); Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d
785 (1963); Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962); Fernandi v.
Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1961).
"'There shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause
of action shall have accrued, and not afterward, all actions or suits in court of the
following description ... action for injury done to the person of another." Tax.
REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5526 (1948).
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The Supreme Court of Texas held that, for purposes of the running
of the statute of limitation, the cause of action accrued at the time
the patient discovered or, in the exercise of due diligence, should
have discovered the sponge, and not at the time of the operation.
The court recognized that a primary objective of the statute of limita-
tion is to prevent stale and fraudulent claims but concluded that on
these facts the possibility of perpetrating a fraud on the defendant
was slight. Furthermore, the disadvantage to the defendant was more
than counterbalanced by the injustice to the plaintiff resulting from
the contrary rule barring the patient from recovery, when he could not
have ascertained the negligent act until after the passage of the
period prescribed by the statute of limitation.
It is generally stated that there are two American rules governing
the running of the statutes of limitation in medical malpractice
actions.5 In the majority of states, the statute begins to run at the
date of the operation; 6 while in the minority, the statute commences
running only after the discovery of the alleged malpractice.7
The principle most frequently relied upon by those courts re-
jecting the discovery rule is that statutes of limitation were estab-
lished to protect individuals from long and bothersome waiting periods
after which they would encounter the difficulty of defending stale
5But see text accompanying note 20 infra.
'E.g., Saffold v. Scarborough, 91 Ga. App. 628, 86 S.E.2d 649 (1955); Mosby v.
Michael Reese Hosp., 49 II. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 633 (1964); Guy v. Schuldt,
236 Ind. 1o, 138 N.E.2d 891 (1956); Hill v. Hays, 193 Kan. 453, 395 P.2d 298 (1964);
Philpot v. Stacy, 371 S.W.2d ii (Ky. 1963); Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me. 228, 182
A.2d 660 (1962); Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 45o , 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966); Wilder
v. St. Joseph Hosp., 225 Miss. 42, 82 So. 2d 651 (1955); Roybal v. White, 72 N.M.
285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963); Seger v. Cornwell, 44 Misc. 2d 994, 255 N.Y.S.2d 744
(1964); Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510, 73 S.E.2d 32o (1952); Pump v. Fox, 113 Ohio
App. 15o, 177 N.E.2d 520 (ig6i); Hall v. DeSaussure, 41 Tenn. App. 572, 297 S.W.2d
81 (1956); Murray v. Allen, 103 Vt. 373, 154 A. 678 (1931); Hawks v. Dehart, 2o6
Va. 8io, 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966); Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d 675, 277 P.2d
724 (1954); -McCluskey v. Thranow, 31 Wis. 2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787 (1966); see
Annot., 8o-A.L.R.2d 368 (1961).
1 Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 9o8 (1936); Rosane v. Senger, 112
Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944); City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954);
Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964); Springer v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 169 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 1964); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md.
137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966); Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785
(1963); Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hosp., 417 P.2d 469 (Mont. 1966); Spath v. Morrow,
174 Neb. 38, 115 NAV.2d 581 (1962); Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 3oo (Okla. 1961);
Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996 (Ore. 1966); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d
788 (1959); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967); Morgan v. Grace Hosp.,
Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).
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claims.5 This rationale exposes a conflict between two basic policies
of law: (i) to discourage stale and fraudulent claims; (2) to permit
meritorious claimants an opportunity to present their cases. Tantish v.
SzendeyO typifiies the majority viewpoint in resolving this conflict by
indicating that although a stale claim may be meritorious, the statute
of limitation is inflexible and operates without reference to the merits
in cutting off claims. In addition, these courts contend that adoption of
the discovery rule necessitates an interpretation which denies effect
to the plain words of the statute.' 0 Consequently, those courts re-
jecting the discovery rule conclude that adoption of the rule in effect
amends the statute of limitation, a function purely legislative in
character." The courts find support for their position in the fact that
the legislatures of several states have amended statutes of limitation to
include the discovery rule in situations involving fraudulent conceal-
ment of a cause of action but have remained silent as to situations
involving malpractice.' 2 They conclude that the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another, and therefore, the legislature did
not intend to extend the concept of discovery to simple negligence
or malpractice actions; and it is not within the court's province to
do so.
1 3
In maintaining that a cause of action accrues at the time of the
operation, these courts adhere to the fundamental proposition that
at some point in time claims must be held to have become barred.'
4 It
is recognized that the statute of limitation for personal injury actions
8Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me. 228, 182 A.2d 66o (1962); McCluskey v. Thranow,
31 Wis. 2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787 (1966); see 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 1
(1948)-
9158 Me. 228, 182 A.2d 66o (1962).
"0 Hill v. Hays, 193 Kan. 453, 395 P.2d 298 (1964); Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me.
228, 182 A.2d 66o (1962); Murray v. Allen, 103 Vt. 373, 154 A. 678 (1931).
"Hill v. Hays, 193 Kan. 453, 395 P.2d 298 (1964); Philpot v. Stacy, 371 S.W.2d
ii (Ky. 1963); Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d 675, 277 P.2d 724 (1954).
'"E.g., "If a person liable to an action fraudulently conceals the cause of such
action from the knowledge of the persons entitled thereto, the action may be com-
menced at any time within five years after the person entitled to bring the same
discovers that he has such cause of action, and not afterwards." ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 83, § 23 (Smith-Hurd 1965); see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-7 (1953); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 102.12 (1957)-
"Mosby v. Michael Reese Hosp., 49 111. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 633 (1964);
Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me. 228, 182 A.2d 66o (1962); Pasquale v. Chandler, 350
Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966); Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250
(1963) ; Seger v. Cornwell, 44 Misc. 2d 944, 255 'N.Y.2d 744 (1964); McCluskey
v. Thranow, 31 Wis. 2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787 (1966).
14Owens v. White, 38o F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1967).
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begins to run when the negligent act occurs.15 Courts rejecting the
discovery rule contend that to permit an extension in time to allow
the presentation of a meritorious claim may also prohibit the physi-
cian from presenting a meritorious defense. These courts conclude that
the need of certainty in establishing the time when an action accrued
outweighs any hardship to a meritorious claimant.16
The discovery rule was preceded by other rules designed to avoid
the harsh results of the traditional application of the statutes of
limitation. A continuous treatment theory has been used by some
courts in situations where a doctor leaves a foreign object in the body
of a patient and continues to treat him after the operation. The physi-
cian is said to be negligent not only in his initial action but also in
allowing the object to remain in the patient's body while the patient
is still under his care. According to this analysis, the statutes of
limitation do not begin to run until the patient leaves the care of
the physician.'7 As another means of avoiding the personal-injury
statute of limitation, plaintiffs have couched their complaints in terms
of contract to take advantage of a longer statute of limitation.' s Still
another means of avoidance exists where knowledge of the injury has
been fraudulently concealed by the physician; the statute of limitation
does not begin to run until the negligent act is discovered or could
have been discovered by reasonable diligence on the part of the in-
jured party.' 9
"Mosby v. Michael Reese Hosp., 49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 63 (1964);
Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. ioi, 138 N.E.2d 891 (1956); Wilder v. St. Joseph Hasp.,
225 Miss. 42, 82 So. 2d 651 (1955).
"Owens v. White, 38o F.2d 31o (gth Cir. 1967); Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me. 228,
182 A.2d 66o (1962). The court in Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12
N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 145 (1963), said, "[S]ociety is best served by complete
repose after a certain number of years even at the sacrifice of a few unfortunate
cases."
'7Ehlen v. Burrows, 51 Cal. App. 2d 141, 124 P.2d 82 (1942); De Haan v. Winter,
258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932); Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc.,
253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W.2d 96 (1958); Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d
760 (1943); Williams v. Elias, 14o Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941); Budoff v. Kessler,
284 App. Div. 1049, 135 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1954); DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St.
22, 1o4 N.E.2d 177 (1952); Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932);
Lotten v. O'Brien, 146 Wis. 258, 131 N.W. 361 (1911).
"SSellers v. Noah, 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167 (1923); Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C.
355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956). However, the majority view is that injuries sustained as
a result of medical malpractice are tortious in nature. Annot., 8o A.L.R.2d 32o (1961).
"iMorrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948); Crossett Health Center
v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953); Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363,
149 P.2d 372 (1944); Saffold v. Scarborough, 91 Ga. App. 628, 86 S.E.2d 649 (1955);
Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. 1o, 138 N.E.2d 891 (1956); Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d
1968]
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As a growing number of states adopt one or more of these alterna-
tive theories it is clear that there is a definite trend away from the
majority rule. In a recent case adopting the discovery rule, the Idaho
Supreme Court, in considering the alternative theories, suggested that
in reality there was no longer a majority rule.20 The development of
the discovery rule represents the most recent departure from the tra-
ditional application of statutes of limitation. It has been adopted
by statute in three states21 and by court decision in fifteen others.
22
The application of the discovery rule to malpractice cases is un-
complicated. It is generally limited by courts to cases involving foreign
objects which have been negligently left in a patient's body23 and pro-
vides that the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the
patient learns or should have learned of the presence of the foreign
object.
24
Courts adopting the discovery rule do not interpret its applica-
tion as annulling the purpose of the statutes of limitation. Possible
fraud on the part of the claimant is nullified by the very nature of the
791 (Ky. 1952); Lakeman v. La France, 1o2 N.H. 3oo, 156 A.2d 123 (1959); Moses v.
Miller, 202 Okla. 605, 216 P.2d 979 (195o); Hinkle v. Hargens, 76 S.D. 520, 81
N.W.2d 888 (1957); Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.ad 244 (1932).
OBillings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224, 232 (1964). The
court said, "Indeed, it appears that most jurisdictions, when faced with the set
of facts we have presented herein would, on one theory or another, allow appellants
to come into court and present their claims. To apply the label of 'general rule'
to respondent's position and 'minority rule' to the discovery doctrine is not only
misleading but erroneous. If, however, it is necessary to apply labels, it appears
that the so-called 'general rule' as stated in A.L.R. is in fact the minority rule."
2'CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (1958); Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.100 (1959); ALA.
CODE tit. 7, § 25(1) (1958).
2Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. ad 302, 57 P.2d 9o8 (1936); Rosane v. Senger, 112
Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944); City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954);
Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964); Perrin v. Rodriquez,
153 So. 555 (La. App. 1934); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825
(1966); Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785 (1963); Johnson v. St.
Patrick's Hosp., 417 P.2d 469 (Mont. 1966); Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115
N.W.2d 581 (1962); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Seitz v.
Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1961); Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996 (Ore. 1966); Ayers
v. iMorgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.
1967); Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).
'3Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.ad 825 (1966); Johnson v.
Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785 (1963); Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hosp.,
417 P.2d 469 (Mont. 1966); Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962);
Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1962).
"Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964); Fernandi v.
Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1961);
Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967).
1968] CASE COMMENTS 83
negligent act,25 and it is difficult to maintain that a claimant is "sit-
ting on his rights" when in fact he is unaware that he has such rights.
26
The possibility of a fraudulent or stale claim which the statutes are
designed to prevent does not exist in this particular situation.
27
Courts adopting the discovery doctrine are cognizant of the
reluctance of legislative bodies to incorporate the rule in a statutory
scheme but do not necessarily consider legislative inaction determina-
tive of the ordinary meaning of "accrued" as it is used in the present
statutes of limitation.
28
The cause of action must necessarily accrue to some person
or legal entity. To say that a cause of action accrues to a person
when she may maintain an action thereon and, at the same time,
that it accrues before she has or can reasonably be expected to
have knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon her is patently in-
consistent and unrealistic. She cannot maintain an action before
she knows she has one.
29
These courts contend that its application does not amount to judicial
legislation. The legislature, in formulating the statutes, provided a
specified time limit within which to sue for the defendant's negligence
but left undetermined the question of when the cause of action actually
accrued. They contend that originally the courts determined when
the cause of action actually accrued, and for the courts to re-determine
the matter in view of unusual circumstances does not constitute judicial
legislation but is a matter of statutory interpretation, a purely judicial
function.8 0
Courts declining to adopt the rule premise their decisions on
--See Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936); Spath v. Morrow,
174 Neb. 38, x5 N.W.2d 581 (1962); Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 3oo (Okla. 1961).
OBerry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996 (Ore. 1966); Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc.,
149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).
'As stated in Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277, 286 (i96i), "It
must be borne in mind that Mrs. Fernandi's claim does not raise questions as to her
credibility nor does it rest on matters of professional diagnosis, judgment or dis-
cretion .... Here the lapse of time does not entail the danger of false or frivolous
claim .... Justice cries out that she fairly be afforded a day in court and it appears
evident to us that this may be done.., without any undue impairment of the
two-year limitation or the considerations of repose which underlie it."
"Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996 (Ore. 1966); Linquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d
765, 277 P.2d 724 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
-Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (Ore. 1966); accord, Waldman v. Rohr-
baugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d
878 (1959).
3°Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156, x6o (1965);
accord, Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 999 (Ore. 1966); Ayers v. Morgan, 397
Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959).
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three arguments. Initially, the statutes of limitation are designed to
prevent stale and fraudulent claims and the discovery rule annuls
this purpose. Secondly, the rule hinders the defendant's presentation
of a meritorious defense due to the unusual delay. Finally, adoption
of the rule amounts to judicial legislation in that it makes knowledge
a prerequisite to the accrual of a cause of action when the statute
does not mention knowledge.
An analysis of the three arguments indicates that the courts are
directing their attention more to an abstract application of the statute
than to its application to the particular facts involved. Fraud is not
a relevant consideration as the possibility of a fabricated claim is
nullified by the very nature of the negligent act. The presence of the
object in the claimant's body precludes any contention of a false injury
or attempted fraud. Moreover, in view of the unusual circumstances,
to deny recovery to the plaintiff when he could not possibly discover
the negligent act until after the statute had run is a far greater in-
justice than the resulting disadvantage to the defendant.
The judicial legislation argument is more difficult to contend
with because all courts, whether adopting or rejecting the rule, are
engaging equally in judicial legislation. To reject the rule is actually
to indulge in judicial legislation by saying that since the legislature
has not added the requirement of knowledge, in fact, it intended to
exclude it. To adopt the rule, thereby making knowledge a prerequi-
site to the running of the statute, also involves legislation by the courts
since there is no express language in the statute indicating that
knowledge is required for the accrual of an action.
Admittedly, the statutes are silent as to the relationship between
knowledge and the accrual of a cause of action. However, unlike the
legislatures, the courts when confronted with this problem are forced
to make a decision, unaided in most cases by legislative pronounce-
ments. The courts are required to resolve the issue presented by the
statutes' silence, and the most equitable means of insuring that there
will be no injustice to the claimant is to adopt the discovery rule and
require knowledge of the existence of a cause of action as a prerequisite
to the running of the statute of limitation.
ERic L. SISLER
